My hope here in Nice is to draw attention to the work of S. C. Kleene [7] on recursion in objects of finite type. In pursuit of that hope I will touch lightly on some related developments in generalized recursion theory. My Nicene creed is: Kleene's notion of recursive object of finite type and Gödel's notion of constructible set are of similar, but not of the same, substance. An Athanasian might see them as the same after reading Shoenfield [20] on hierarchies, but the Arian view is more balanced in the light of Moschovakis [11, 12] on hyper projective sets.
For each n > 0, ^E is the characteristic function of equality for objects of type < n. Thus 2 E(X, Y) = 0 if X = Y, and = 1 otherwise. 2 E has the same degree as the Turing jump operator. A result of great internal beauty obtained by Kleene [7] is : the objects of type <; 2 recursive in 2 E are just the hyperarithmetic ones. S k U, the k-section of U, is the set of all objects of type k recursive in U. Kleene [7] asked: do there exist F's such that (1) S X F consists of the arithmetic reals?, (2) S ± F consists of the A 2 reals? Recently Grilliot [5] answered (1) Kleene [7] showed that the 2 F-recursively enumerable reals were just the n} reals. Theorem 5 for F = 2 E was proved in [15] .
The super jump is a fundamental object of type 3 introduced by Gandy [3] ; it lifts F to F 1 . Let { e } F (X) denote the value (possibly undefined) of the e-th partial function of type 2 recursive in F for real argument X. The value of F 1 (e, X) is 0 if { e } F (X) is defined and 1 otherwise.
2 E 1 is the hyperjump and has the same degree as E l9 an object of type 2 associated with the Souslin operation and introduced by Tugué [23] . Gandy [3] showed: if F ^ G, then F 1 ^ G 1 . Hinman has asked: is there a condition on G that implies the existence of an F such that F 1 = G? Hinman's question was inspired by Friedberg's classic result [2] : if JO ^ X, then there exists a Y such that JY= X, where 0 is the empty set and J is the Turing jump. THEOREM 6 [18] . -Assume the continuum hypothesis. Then there exists an
The F's of Theorems 1 through 5 are constructed in countably many steps, but the F of Theorem 6 is constructed in uncountably many steps. If the continuum hypothesis is dropped, then Theorem 6 can be approximated in the sense of Theorem 7. The continuum hypothesis is needed to make the approximations cohere with one another. Most of the results of this paper have the following form: a structure B associated with some generalization of recursion theory is given; then an object U of type n is constructed such that the members of B coincide with the objects of type < n that are recursive in U. Since Kleene's definition of relative recursiveness is inductive, it follows that B can be defined by an induction based on U. If enough results of the above form can be found, it may be possible (as Kreisel has suggested) to prove theorems about structures occurring in generalizations of recursion theory by thinking of them as having been built up by inductive definitions based on objects of finite (or higher) type. Among the means to that end would be various sharpenings of Theorem 4. The superjump 3 S is an object of type 3 of lower degree than 3 F, but an application of Corollary 2 above to Platek [14] provides an F of type 2 such that S 1 3 S' = S 1 F. So it seems likely that the hypothesis " n E < U " of Theorem 4 can be replaced by something of wider scope. Theorem 4 can be extended from 1-sections to fc-sections as follows. For each n there is a F of type n such that for all U of type n: if V< U and k < n 9 then S k U = S k W for some W of type k + 1. It is possible that n E may suffice for V, but at the moment I need a V whose degree appears to be higher than n E save when k = 1 (Added in proof : if Gödel's axiom of constructibility holds, then V = "£.)
